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1. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 635 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
2. Am. Fed’n of Teachers-W. Va. v. Kanawha Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 592 F. Supp. 2d 883,
890 (S.D. W. Va. 2009) (quoting a county school superintendent on the need for the
implementation of a suspicionless drug testing policy for teachers). 
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THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND CONTRACTUAL
CONTROVERSY OF SUSPICIONLESS DRUG
TESTING OF PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS
AMANDA HARMON COOLEY*, MARKA B. FLEMING**
& GWENDOLYN MCFADDEN-WADE***
Precisely because the need for action against the drug scourge is
manifest, the need for vigilance against unconstitutional excess is
great.1
[These suspicionless drug testing policies are] one more step we
have to go to keep children safe, to make sure they’re secure in the
classroom when [the teachers] have your daughter or your
grandchild . . . for the majority of the day behind closed doors.2 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2011
422 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  63:421
3. See, e.g., David Hunn, Teacher Drug Testing Takes Root in Elk Hills, BAKERSFIELD
CALIFORNIAN, Feb. 4, 2005, at A1 (discussing the consideration of “a one-school, four-teacher
district” in California to require mandatory suspicionless drug testing); Rhonda Simmons,
Culpeper Looks at Drug Testing for New Teachers: Issues May Include Cost, Scheduling and
Legal Ramifications, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, June 20, 2008, at B-5 (discussing a Virginia
school board’s consideration of a policy that would require a suspicionless drug test of all
teachers as a condition for employment).
4. See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995) (“[F]or many
purposes, ‘school authorities act in loco parentis,’ with the power and indeed the duty to
‘inculcate the habits and manners of civility.’” (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478
U.S. 675, 681, 684 (1986) (citation omitted))).
5. See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. # 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2646 (2009) (Thomas,
J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“‘[I]n more recent years, school
disorder has often taken particularly ugly forms: drug use and violent crime in the schools have
become major social problems.’” (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985))).
6. See id. (“For nearly 25 years this Court has understood that ‘[m]aintaining order in the
classroom has never been easy.’” (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339)).
7. See, e.g., Vaishali Honawar, Random Drug Tests Test Teacher Privacy Rights: Schools
Adopt Policy for Safety, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2009, at A1 (“A growing number of school
districts and states are trying to give teachers random drug tests, citing student safety concerns
. . . . ”).
8. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 407 (2007) (noting the serious problem of
drug use by the youth of America and the importance of deterrence of drug use in a school
setting).
9. See, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 635 (1989) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (“[W]hen we allow fundamental freedoms to be sacrificed in the name of real or
perceived exigency, we invariably come to regret it.”); Jones v. Graham Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 677
S.E.2d 171, 182 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (“Constitutional rights are not lightly cast aside.”).
I. Introduction
Throughout the United States, vastly divergent school boards and districts
have struggled with the potential implementation and enforcement of policies
that would require the random, suspicionless, mandatory drug testing of their
teachers.3  At the center of many of these discussions are important policy
considerations that include the protection of children in schools with teachers
who act in loco parentis,4 the attempt to limit exposure of children to drugs,5
and the provision of a safe, orderly environment within the public schools.6
The magnitude of these considerations has been reiterated by school districts7
and by the Supreme Court.8  Counterbalanced with these issues are the equally
important fundamental privacy rights of teachers, as guaranteed under federal
and state constitutions, and the perils that accompany a violation of these
rights.9
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10. See, e.g., Elizabeth Kolbert, Test of Teachers For Use of Drugs Is Ruled Illegal, N.Y.
TIMES, June 10, 1987, at A1 (stating that, by 1987, “[c]ourts in more than a dozen states have
been asked to rule on the subject [of suspicionless drug testing of teachers or other public
employees]”).
11. See Patchogue-Medford Cong. of Teachers v. Bd. of Educ., 510 N.E.2d 325, 326-27
(N.Y. 1987).
12. See id. at 329-30.
13. Compare Ginger Orr, The Knox v. Knox Decision and Drug Testing for Public School
Employees: Why Educators Do Not Shed Their Rights at the Schoolhouse Gate, 29 J.L. & EDUC.
547, 552 (2000) (“Mandatory drug testing for educators [will not infringe] . . . on [their]
constitutional rights.”) with Karin Schmidt, Suspicionless Drug Urinalysis of Public School
Teachers: The Concern for Student Safety Cannot Outweigh Teachers’ Legitimate Privacy
Interests, 34 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 253, 276 (2001) (“[W]e cannot allow our desire to
attain drug-free schools to amount to . . . a ‘cavalier disregard of the text of the Constitution.’”
(quoting Skinner, 489 U.S. at 641 (Marshall, J., dissenting))).
14. See 158 F.3d 361, 384 (6th Cir. 1998).
15. See 142 F.3d 853, 856-57 (5th Cir. 1998).
16. See id.
17. See infra notes 76-235 and accompanying text.
18. Since 2007, Hawaii has been wrestling with these policies in its collective bargaining
agreements with its teachers.  See Alexandre Da Silva, Rejection of Drug Test Draws Threat
The issues in this debate are by no means new ones.10  As early as 1985, a
public school district in New York required its teachers, as a condition for
tenure consideration, to submit to a suspicionless urinalysis in order to detect
illegal drug use.11  After the state teachers’ union brought a state and federal
constitutional challenge to this policy in Patchogue-Medford Congress of
Teachers v. Board of Education, the Court of Appeals of New York ultimately
held that the school district had violated both state and federal constitutional
guarantees against unreasonable searches and seizures.12
Despite this early ruling, questions of the propriety and constitutionality of
suspicionless drug testing of teachers policies are far from resolved.13  Indeed,
in the 1998 case of Knox County Education Ass’n v. Knox County Board of
Education, the Sixth Circuit determined that a one-time suspicionless drug
testing requirement for teachers did not violate the Fourth Amendment.14  In
that same year, the Fifth Circuit, in United Teachers v. Orleans Parish School
Board, overturned the denial of a motion for preliminary injunction of a policy
that required the suspicionless drug testing of teachers who were in accidents
during the course of their employment.15  The court based its decision on a
finding that such a policy violated the Fourth Amendment.16  After Knox
County and United Teachers, court rulings on challenges to these policies have
been far from consistent.17  Additionally, the presence of these policies has not
disappeared from state educational contract negotiations.18
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from Lingle, HONOLULU STAR-BULL., Jan. 26, 2008, at A6 (“In May [2007], despite resistance
from some teachers concerning [a requirement for suspicionless drug tests], the 13,000-member
Hawaii State Teachers Association ratified a nearly $120 million, two-year contract awarding
them 4 percent raises in the current and next school years.”); Gary T. Kubota, Teachers Approve
Contract: The Vote is 81 Percent in Favor of a Two-Year Deal that Cuts 17 Days from the
School Year, HONOLULU STAR-BULL., Sept. 23, 2009, at 5 (stating that the 2009 ratified
collective bargaining agreement did not contain provisions on suspicionless drug testing of
teachers as the union and the state are awaiting guidance from the courts on the matter).
19. Crager v. Bd. of Educ., 313 F. Supp. 2d 690 (E.D. Ky. 2004) (docket report and
selected case documents on file with authors).
20. Am. Fed’n of Teachers-W. Va. v. Kanawha Cnty. Bd. of Educ, 592 F. Supp. 2d 883
(S.D. W. Va. 2008) (docket report and selected case documents on file with authors).
21. Knox Cnty. Educ. Ass’n v. Knox Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 158 F.3d 361 (6th Cir. 1998).
22. See Crager, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 702; see also Memorandum Opinion and Order at 25,
Crager, 313 F. Supp. 2d 690 (No. 7:04-155-DCR) [hereinafter Crager Memorandum Opinion]
(on file with authors).
23. See Consent Decree at 2, Kanawha Cnty., 592 F. Supp. 2d 883 (No. 2:08-cv-1406)
[hereinafter Kanawha Cnty. Consent Decree] (on file with authors).
24. See Kanawha Cnty., 592 F. Supp. 2d at 891.
25. See Jones v. Graham Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 677 S.E.2d 171, 173 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009);
see also Complaint at 2, Jones, 677 S.E.2d 171 (No. 07 CVS 81) [hereinafter Jones Complaint]
(on file with authors).
26. See Jones, 677 S.E.2d at 173.
The purpose of this paper is to conduct a legal analysis of the current trend
of the implementation and enforcement of policies that require random,
suspicionless drug testing of public school teachers.  It will take a critical
approach to the federal constitutional implications of these policies by
analyzing two model cases: Crager v. Board of Education19 and American
Federation of Teachers-West Virginia v. Kanawha County Board of
Education.20  In the 2004 Crager case, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Kentucky, relying heavily upon Knox,21 upheld the
constitutionality of a random, suspicionless drug testing policy for teachers.22
Conversely, in August 2009, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia in Kanawha County ordered a permanent injunction
barring the enforcement of a random suspicionless drug testing policy for
teachers,23 premised on a preliminary injunction finding that such testing was
not consistent with the constitutional protections of the Fourth Amendment.24
Additionally, the paper will address the state constitutional considerations
in these types of cases through the lens of Jones v. Graham County Board of
Education, which involved a state constitutional challenge to another random,
suspicionless drug testing policy for teachers.25  In Jones, the North Carolina
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s summary judgment decision in
favor of the Board of Education and found that the policy violated the State’s
constitutional provision on unreasonable searches.26
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27. See, e.g., Ken Kobayashi, Legal Limbo Stalls Teacher Drug Tests: Court Challenges
Likely Will Delay Teacher Drug Checks for Months or Even Years, HONOLULU STAR-BULL.,
Feb. 1, 2009, at A1  (discussing the contentious inclusion of suspicionless drug testing of
teachers policies within the state’s education collective bargaining negotiation and contract, as
well as the aftermath of such inclusion).
28. See, e.g., Brunswick County Teachers to Face Random Drug Testing, WWAY (June
6, 2007), http://www.wwaytv3.com/brunswick_county_teachers_to_face_random_drug_test
ing/06/2007 (stating that the yearly cost of a proposed drug testing policy for a North Carolina
county would be $25,000).
29. See, e.g., Linda Jacobson, Teacher Drug-Testing Program in Hawaii Stalls Over Who
Will Pay, EDUC. WK., July 30, 2008, at 16 (“Random drug testing of Hawaii’s public school
teachers was supposed to begin a month ago, but a stalemate [between the governor and the
state board of education] over who will ultimately pay for the program has prevented the
process from getting started.”).
30. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
Using these model cases as a foundation for analysis, this paper will provide
a discussion of the key legal considerations for future litigation in this area.
Specifically, this paper will consider the viability of these policies in public
school systems in the future and will call for guidance from the United States
Supreme Court, as well as from state appellate courts.  Such guidance is
crucial for the realms of education, business, and government, in that these
policies have been at the crux of state educational labor negotiations;27 their
implementation carries with them a lucrative result for the private entities that
provide the testing services;28 and they involve the contentious issue of who
will bear the costs of this implementation.29  In touching on all of these
considerations, the intent of this paper is to serve as a reference for school
districts, states, and their counsel in their contemplation of whether or not to
adopt policies that mandate the random, suspicionless drug testing of their
teachers.
II. The United States Constitution and Policies That Require the Random,
Suspicionless Drug Testing of Teachers
A. Background
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that 
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.30 
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31. Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
32. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949), overruled on other grounds by Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
33. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 307 (1997).
34. Camara, 387 U.S. at 528 (noting that this translation “is a difficult task which has for
many years divided the members of this Court”).
35. Compare Am. Fed’n of Teachers-W. Va. v. Kanawha Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 592 F. Supp.
2d 883, 891-99 (S.D. W. Va. 2009) (providing a detailed discussion to the process of analysis
that the court would apply in determining the constitutionality of a suspicionless drug testing
policy for teachers) with Crager Memorandum Opinion, supra note 22, at 25 (summarizing its
analytical approach, which is similar to the approach in Kanawha County, to the
constitutionality of a suspicionless drug testing of teachers policy).
36. See, e.g., Knox Cnty. Educ. Ass’n v. Knox Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 158 F.3d 361, 371 n.9
(6th Cir. 1998) (“The Fourth Amendment, although initially applicable only to the federal
government, is now applicable to states as well by virtue of selective incorporation through the
Fourteenth Amendment.”).
37. See, e.g., Kanawha Cnty., 592 F. Supp. 2d at 892 (noting that a public school board “is
an arm of the government, and as such may not conduct unreasonable searches of its employees
in violation of the Fourth Amendment”).
38. See Crager Memorandum Opinion, supra note 22, at 5 (“A urinalysis drug test by a
state agency qualifies as a government search, thus implicating the Fourth Amendment”).
39. See, e.g., Kanawha Cnty., 592 F. Supp. 2d at 892-93 (signifying its use of the special
On multiple occasions, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that the essential
“purpose of this Amendment . . . is to safeguard the privacy and security of
individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.”31  The Court
has also stated that Fourth Amendment rights are “basic to our free society”32
and cannot be sacrificed merely “for a symbol’s sake.”33 Despite a general
judicial consensus on the ideological purpose of the fundamental privacy
protections contained within the Fourth Amendment, courts have often
struggled with formulating a “translation of the abstract prohibition against
‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ into workable guidelines for the decision
of particular cases.”34  Despite varying conclusions, courts that have addressed
the issue of the federal constitutionality of random, suspicionless drug testing
of teachers have taken a relatively consistent approach in their analytical
processes.35  At the outset, the courts typically state three basic undisputed
premises: 1) the protections of the Fourth Amendment apply to the states
through the incorporation of the Fourteenth Amendment;36 2) school districts,
school boards, and states are considered state actors, which prohibits them
from violating the Fourth Amendment;37 and 3) drug testing qualifies as a
search for Fourth Amendment analysis purposes.38
After outlining these foundational understandings, courts have employed a
“special needs” analysis and balancing test to determine the constitutionality
of random, suspicionless drug testing policies for teachers.39  This approach
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needs approach to determine the constitutionality of a suspicionless drug testing policy for
teachers); Crager v. Bd. of Educ., 313 F. Supp. 2d 690, 693 (E.D. Ky. 2004) (same); Knox
Cnty., 158 F.3d at 373 (same).
40. Knox Cnty., 158 F.3d at 373 (quoting Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313 (1997)).
41. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989) (internal quotations
omitted).
42. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 314.
43. Kanawha Cnty., 592 F. Supp. 2d at 893.
44. Baron v. City of Hollywood, 93 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1340 (S.D. Fla. 2000).
45. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620.
46. See Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-66, 677 (1989).
47. See Wilcher v. City of Wilmington, 139 F.3d 366, 374-78 (3d Cir. 1998); Saavedra v.
City of Albuquerque, 73 F.3d 1525, 1531-32 (10th Cir. 1996).
48. See Guiney v. Roache, 873 F.2d 1557, 1558 (1st Cir. 1989).
49. See Booker v. City of St. Louis, 309 F.3d 464, 467 (8th Cir. 2002).
50. See Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. U.S. Nuclear Reg. Comm’n, 966 F.2d 521, 526 (9th
Cir. 1992).
51. See AFGE Local 1533 v. Cheney, 944 F.2d 503, 506 (9th Cir. 1991).
52. See Krieg v. Seybold, 481 F.3d 512, 518-19 (7th Cir. 2007); Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, W. Conference of Teamsters v. DOT, 932 F.2d 1292, 1304 (9th Cir. 1991).
hinges on the recognition that “a valid search must ordinarily be based on an
‘individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.’”40  The analysis then proceeds to
acknowledge that a suspicionless search may still be constitutional when it is
conducted for “special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement.”41
When the justification for a suspicionless search is that of special needs, a
“context-specific inquiry” is required.42  Specifically, “[t]o determine whether
a special need exists, a court must ask whether there is a safety concern that is
substantial enough to override the individual’s privacy interest and to suppress
the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of individualized suspicion.”43  Quite
simply, “the Court must balance the individual’s privacy interests against the
government's interest.”44
This special needs approach is not limited to questions of suspicionless drug
testing in schools.  Federal courts have applied the special needs analysis to
find suspicionless drug testing to be justified and constitutionally reasonable
in the cases of railway workers involved in train accidents;45 U.S. Customs
Service employees who carry firearms or are involved in the interdiction of
illegal drugs;46 firefighters;47 police officers;48 correctional officers;49 clerical
workers in a nuclear plant;50 engineers with high-level safety clearances;51 and
municipal and commercial truck drivers.52
Yet not all cases involving suspicionless drug testing have arrived at a
conclusion of a sufficient constitutional special need.  In Chandler v. Miller,
the Supreme Court held that a Georgia statute that required all “candidates for
state office [to] pass a drug test . . . [did] not fit within the closely guarded
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2011
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53. 520 U.S. 305, 309 (1997).
54. See Baron v. City of Hollywood, 93 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1342 (S.D. Fla. 2000).
55. See 518 F.3d 1147, 1149 (9th Cir. 2008).
56. See id. at 1150.
57. Id. at 1152.
58. See 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
59. Id. at 648.
60. See id. at 653.
category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches.”53  Relying on
Chandler, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
invalidated a policy that required the pre-employment suspicionless drug
testing of all city employees.54  A similar case was brought in Lanier v. City
of Woodburn, where an applicant for a part-time library page position
challenged a policy that required suspicionless drug testing of all prospective
city employees.55  The Ninth Circuit refused to facially invalidate the policy
because the applicant did not demonstrate that it could “never be applied . . .
constitutional[ly].”56  However, the court did find that the policy was
unconstitutional as applied, because the city had “not articulated any special
need to screen [the applicant] without suspicion” and had not shown a
“substantial risk to public safety posed by [the applicant’s] prospective
position.”57 
The special needs approach to examining the constitutionality of
suspicionless drug testing is firmly established in federal jurisprudence and has
been applied to a range of situations.  However, in examining the
constitutionality of suspicionless drug testing of teachers, courts have relied
on cases involving other types of suspicionless drug testing within the
schoolhouse gate.  It is in this context-specific balancing that courts have
reached starkly different conclusions on the legality of these policies for
teachers.  Before analyzing the divergent holdings of the federal courts in this
area, it is first important to look at the environment that has resulted from
courts’ consideration of requirements for suspicionless drug testing for
students.
In 1995, the Supreme Court decided Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton,
an important case in the overall context of schools, the Fourth Amendment,
and random suspicionless drug testing.58  In Vernonia, the court analyzed the
constitutionality of an Oregon school district’s policy that “authorize[d]
random urinalysis drug testing of students who participate[d] in the District’s
school athletics programs.”59  In a 6-3 decision, the Court found a special need
that supported the policy’s lack of individualized suspicion for these searches:
the maintenance of order in the public school.60  The Court also found that
students have diminished privacy interests given the in loco parentis
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61. See id. at 654-56.
62. Id. at 657.
63. See id. at 660-61.
64. See id. at 661.
65. Id. at 664-65.
66. Id. at 665.
67. See 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
68. Id. at 825.
69. See id. at 832.
70. See id. at 834.
71. Id.
relationship that schools have over them.61  Further, the Court stated that
“[s]omewhat like adults who choose to participate in a ‘closely regulated
industry,’ students who voluntarily participate in school athletics have reason
to expect intrusions upon normal rights and privileges, including privacy.”62
In examining the procedures for testing, the Court determined that their level
of intrusion was not significant.63  Finally, the Court found that the need to
deter drug use among students was an important governmental need.64  As
such, based on all of these factors, “the decreased expectation of privacy, the
relative unobtrusiveness of the search, and the severity of the need met by the
search, [the Court] conclude[d] Vernonia’s Policy is reasonable and hence
constitutional.”65  However, immediately after its holding, the Court warned
against the use of the case as a panacea for constitutional challenges against
suspicionless drug testing in all other contexts: 
We caution against the assumption that suspicionless drug testing
will readily pass constitutional muster in other contexts.  The most
significant element in this case is . . . that the Policy was
undertaken in furtherance of the government’s responsibilities,
under a public school system, as guardian and tutor of children
entrusted to its care.66
In the 2002 decision of Board of Education v. Earls, the Supreme Court had
an opportunity to analyze the constitutionality of a suspicionless drug testing
policy as applied to another population of public school students.67  At issue
in this case was a Fourth Amendment challenge to an Oklahoma school
district’s policy that “require[d] all students who participate in competitive
extracurricular activities to submit to [random suspicionless] drug testing.”68
Building upon the Vernonia foundation in this 5-4 decision, the Court swiftly
concluded that the policy was constitutional as the students who participated
in regulated extracurricular activities had a diminished expectation of
privacy;69 the testing was minimally intrusive;70 “the nationwide drug epidemic
makes the war against drugs a pressing concern in every school”;71 and this
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2011
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72. Id. at 837.
73. This is a concern articulated in Justice Ginsburg’s dissent: 
Vernonia cannot be read to endorse invasive and suspicionless drug testing of all
students upon any evidence of drug use, solely because drugs jeopardize the life
and health of those who use them. Many children, like many adults, engage in
dangerous activities on their own time; that the children are enrolled in school
scarcely allows government to monitor all such activities. . . . Had the Vernonia
Court agreed that public school attendance, in and of itself, permitted the State to
test each student’s blood or urine for drugs, the opinion . . . could have saved
many words. 
Id. at 844-45 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
74. 313 F. Supp. 2d 690 (E.D. Ky. 2004); see also Civil Docket, Crager, 313 F. Supp. 2d
690 (No. 7:04-155-DCR) (docket report and selected case documents on file with authors).
75. 592 F. Supp. 2d 883 (S.D. W. Va. 2008); see also Civil Docket, Kanawha Cnty., 592
F. Supp. 2d 883 (No. 2:08-cv-1406) (docket report and selected case documents on file with
authors).
76. See Crager, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 691.
77. See id.; see also Complaint at 2-4, Crager, 313 F. Supp. 2d 690 (No. 7:04-155-DCR)
[hereinafter Crager Complaint] (on file with the authors).
78. See also Crager Complaint, supra note 77, at 1-2.
79. See Crager, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 691-92; see also Crager Complaint, supra note 77, at
4.  Crager also claimed that the drug and alcohol testing policy and the Board’s “actions
violate[d] the medical privacy provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act” (ADA).  See
Crager Complaint, supra note 77, at 4.  On this issue, the court held that “[d]rug testing is not
a ‘medical exam’ and [that] the ADA explicitly states that it does not prohibit the use of drug
drug testing was “a reasonably effective means of addressing the School
District’s legitimate concerns in preventing, deterring, and detecting drug
use.”72  The Earls case demonstrates that the Court is not afraid to dramatically
extend the scope of its definition of “special needs.”73
Given this background, it is now important to examine the federal
constitutional concerns at play in two model cases that involved random
suspicionless drug testing of teachers: Crager v. Board of Education74 and
American Federation of Teachers-West Virginia v. Kanawha County Board
of Education.75
B. Crager v. Board of Education
Crager was filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Kentucky on March 25, 2004.76  The plaintiff, Carol Crager, a tenured
elementary school teacher, sought to enjoin the Knott County Board of
Education’s drug and alcohol testing policy, which required the random,
suspicionless testing of its teachers.77  The lawsuit was filed against the Board
and its Superintendent, Harold Combs.78  Specifically, Crager alleged in her
complaint that the defendants’ drug testing policy violated her Fourth
Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.79
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testing programs.”  See Crager, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 702-03.   Therefore, the court determined
that Crager’s ADA claim lacked merit.  Id. at 703; see also Crager Memorandum Opinion,
supra note 22, at 26.
80. See Crager, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 691; see also Crager Memorandum Opinion, supra note
22, at 1-2.
81. See Crager, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 691; see also Crager Memorandum Opinion, supra note
22, at 1.
82. Crager, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 691. 
83. Id.; see also Valarie Honeycutt Spears, Drug Tests on Knott Teachers are Halted, Suit
Challenges Board Policy, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, Apr. 2, 2004, at B1 (quoting
Superintendent Combs as stating “‘[w]e feel like there are so many drugs controlling our
society’ and Knott County that a remedy should begin with the schools”).
84. Crager, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 692; see also Crager Memorandum Opinion, supra note 22,
at 2.
85. Crager, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 691; see also Crager Memorandum Opinion, supra note 22,
at 2.
86. Crager Complaint, supra note 77, at 2-3. 
87. See id. at 3. 
1. Background of the Case
At the commencement of her lawsuit, Crager had fourteen years of
experience with the Knott County school system and was teaching at an
elementary school, which was one of nine public schools in the county.80  This
county was in an area of Eastern Kentucky that had encountered a severe
problem with illegal and prescription drug abuse.81  Before January 2004, the
Board had “adopted a suspicion-based method of drug testing for its
teachers.”82  However, because of the area’s drug epidemic, the Board decided
to take another “approach to meet its [objective] of having a drug-free school
system.”83
Consequently, the Board adopted a policy (“the Knott policy”) on January
15, 2004, which mandated the “random suspicionless drug testing of
employees in ‘safety sensitive’ positions,” including teachers.84  Under this
policy, “25% of all employees considered to be in ‘safety sensitive’ positions
[were to] be randomly-selected for testing without regard to suspicion of
illegal drug use.”85  Additionally, this policy required “all applicants for ‘safety
sensitive’ positions to submit to a urinalysis test to detect illegal drug use as
part of a pre-employment physical,” and it required “all staff currently
employed in a safety sensitive position . . . be given the initial drug testing
required for pre-employment.”86  The consequences of violating this policy
included suspension, non-renewal of employment, or termination.87
Nevertheless, the Superintendent could choose as an alternative for an
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2011
432 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  63:421
88. See id. at 3-4.
89. Crager, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 692.
90. See id. at 699; see also Crager Memorandum Opinion, supra note 22, at 17-18.
91. See Crager Memorandum Opinion, supra note 22, at 18.
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94. Id. at 18-19.
95. See Crager Complaint, supra note 77, at 4. 
96. See Crager v. Bd. of Educ., 313 F. Supp. 2d 690, 691-92 (E.D. Ky. 2004); see also
Agreed Temporary Restraining Order at 1, Crager, 313 F. Supp. 2d 690 (No. 7:04-155-DCR)
(on file with the authors); Drug Testing Policy, KENTUCKY POST, Apr. 3, 2004, at A12 (noting
the County’s agreement “to briefly stop mandatory drug testing of teachers” after the filing of
the Crager lawsuit).
97. See Crager, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 692. 
employee to participate in a Board-approved drug abuse rehabilitation
program.88
In conjunction with the Knott Policy, the county “entered into an agreement
. . . with On-Site Drug Screens (OSDS), outsourcing the testing duties to
OSDS and setting forth the relevant policies and procedures for testing.”89
Specifically, OSDS utilized a Medical Review Officer (MRO) who was trained
to analyze urinalysis drug testing results.90  To protect privacy, collection was
conducted in a private room, unless there was a suspicion of tampering.91  An
initial test was then completed; if that “test [was] negative, no further action
[was] taken.”92  With a positive result, the sample was sent to a lab.93
Thereafter, 
if the lab confirm[ed] the positive result, the MRO consult[ed] the
test subject.  If the subject claim[ed] to have a valid prescription for
the substance the MRO . . . confirm[ed] that fact with the
employee’s pharmacist or physician.  The MRO then made a
determination as to whether the positive test was due to a
legitimate, medical reason.  [If it was not], the result was reported
as “positive.”  If the MRO determine[d] that the drug was used for
a legitimate purpose, [the Superintendent] was . . . notified that the
result was “negative.”94
Although testing was scheduled to take place at Crager’s school in March
2004,95 the Board agreed to a temporary restraining order ceasing drug testing
“until a hearing could be held” on Crager’s motion for a preliminary
injunction.96  This motion was heard on April 6, 2004.97  After considering the
evidence, the district court found that Crager had little likelihood of
succeeding on her claim that the Knott Policy and procedures violated her
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100. See Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 1, Crager, 313 F. Supp. 2d 690 (No.
7:04-155-DCR) (on file with the authors); Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 1,
Crager, 313 F. Supp. 2d 690 (No. 7:04-155-DCR) (on file with the authors).
101. See Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 2, Crager,
313 F. Supp. 2d 690 (No. 7:04-155-DCR) (on file with the authors).
102. See id. at 9.
103. See id. at 11.
104. See Response and Objection to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 4, Crager,
313 F. Supp. 2d 690 (No. 7:04-155-DCR) (on file with the authors).
105. Id. at 12.
106. Id. at 17.
107. See Crager Memorandum Opinion, supra note 22, at 4-5.
108. Id.; see Int’l Union v. Winters, 385 F.3d 1003, 1005, 1012-13 (6th Cir. 2004)
(affirming the district court’s finding that the policy did not violate the Fourth Amendment, as
Fourth Amendment rights.98  Consequently, the court denied Crager’s motion
for a preliminary injunction and vacated the agreed upon temporary restraining
order.99  Thereafter, on November 15, 2004, Crager and the defendants filed
cross-motions for summary judgment.100
2. The Parties’ Arguments
In her motion for summary judgment, Crager argued that the Knott Policy
was unconstitutional because it was not supported by a “special need,” which
is required to justify infringing upon a teacher’s right to privacy.101  To support
this argument, Crager claimed that: (1) the Board’s testing interests were
already met by the suspicion-based testing policy in place 102 and (2) the
suspicionless testing procedures violated teachers’ privacy rights.103  In
contrast, the defendants contended that (1) the Knott Policy was constitutional
because it was supported by a special need;104 (2) the constitutionality of the
suspicionless drug testing policy was not related to the previously established
testing policy;105 and (3) the suspicionless testing procedures were narrowly
tailored and consistently applied.106
3. Court’s Analysis of the Constitutionality of the Drug Testing Policy
The court began its analysis on the cross-motions for summary judgment by
discussing Sixth Circuit case law that had been decided since the “[c]ourt’s
denial of Crager’s motion for a preliminary injunction.”107  These cases
included International Union v. Winters, which “held that Michigan’s random,
suspicionless drug tests” of civil service employees who provided services to
parolees, prisoners, and occupants of state hospitals “did not violate the Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.”108  This
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initial nod to Winters was the court’s first step towards ultimately finding that
the Knott Policy was constitutional.109
After discussing Winters, the court began its specific constitutional analysis
of the suspicionless drug testing policy.110  First, the court emphasized that an
exception to the general rule against suspicionless government searches arises
when the search requires “a ‘special need’ of the state, unrelated to crime
detection, in which ‘the privacy interests implicated by the search are minimal,
and where an important governmental interest furthered by the intrusion would
be placed in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspicion.’”111  The
court then stated that “[s]pecial needs can arise when the job being tested is
‘safety sensitive,’ meaning that the job involves ‘discharge of duties fraught
with risks of injury to others such that even a momentary lapse of attention can
have disastrous consequences.’”112
The court next determined that it would have to apply a balancing test,
weighing the plaintiff’s privacy interest against the Board’s “special needs.”113
In applying this balancing test, the court relied heavily upon Knox County
Education Ass’n v. Knox County Board of Education.114  In Knox County, the
Sixth Circuit held that the Knox County, Tennessee, school system’s one-time,
non-random suspicionless drug and alcohol testing policy for individuals who
applied for, transferred to, or were promoted to “safety sensitive” positions
was constitutional.115  Under the Knox Policy, the “safety sensitive” positions
of principals, teachers, and bus drivers were those “where a single mistake by
such employee [could] create an immediate threat of serious harm to students
and fellow employees.”116  Ultimately, the Knox County court determined that
the public interest in suspicionless testing of teachers—that of directly
influencing and supervising children on a daily basis117—outweighed these
teachers’ diminished privacy interests, given “their participation in a heavily
regulated industry.”118
The Crager court compared the facts of its case to those present in Knox
County to determine whether teachers in Kentucky, like Tennessee, were
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status and “the responsibility this places on . . . teachers within each school to secure order and
to protect students from harm while in their custody” and (2) Tennessee’s legal requirements
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120. See Crager Memorandum Opinion, supra note 22, at 8.
121. See id.
122.  Id. at 9.
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. Id. at 10 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Int’l Union v. Winters, 385 F.3d 1003, 1012 (6th
Cir. 2004)).
126. Id.
“heavily regulated” such that there is a diminished expectation of privacy.119
On this issue, the Crager court explained that although Kentucky had not
enacted an in loco parentis statute like the one in Tennessee, Kentucky courts
had recognized teachers’ in loco parentis status.120  Moreover, the court looked
at the fact that Kentucky required teachers to supervise student conduct at
school and on school-sponsored trips.121  Based on these factors, the Crager
court held that 
teachers in Kentucky are “heavily regulated,” as in Tennessee and,
therefore, “when people enter the education profession [in
Kentucky,] they do so with the understanding that the profession is
heavily regulated as to the conduct expected of people in that field,
as well as the responsibilities that they undertake toward students
and colleagues in the schools,” thus lessening their expectation of
privacy.122
Next, the court addressed Crager’s argument that Knott County had to
demonstrate a drug problem among county teachers to justify a suspicionless
testing policy.123  In response to this argument, the court explained that a
finding of an existent area drug problem “was not a prerequisite to establishing
a [constitutional] suspicionless [drug] testing policy.”124  In support of this
finding, the court quoted Winters, stating that “‘the existence of a pronounced
drug problem is not an essential element to the finding of a special need.’”125
Interestingly, despite the court’s disagreement with Crager’s assertion that the
Board was required to demonstrate a pronounced drug problem, it did find
evidence of such a “problem in the Knott County area and, to a more limited
extent, in the [Knott County] school system.”126
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130.  Id. at 11 (quoting The High-Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Program: An Overview,
OFFICE OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/hidta/).  Judicial
notice was also taken “that a joint state-federal task force, named ‘Operation UNITE,’ [which
had] approximately $16 million in federal funding, [had] been established to combat the drug
problem in Eastern Kentucky.”  Id.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See id. at 12.
134. See id. at 12-13.
135. Id.
136. See id. at 13.
137. Id.
Specifically, the court noted Combs’ deposition testimony regarding “six
incidents of suspected drug abuse among the staff and faculty during his eight-
year tenure as superintendent.”127  Also, the court referenced Combs’
testimony “that the community believed there was a drug problem among
Knott County educators.”128  Additional evidence of this drug problem was the
fact that Knott County was located in a part of Kentucky deemed “‘the
prescription-painkiller capital of the United States.’”129  Further, the court took
judicial notice that Knott County was “designated as part of the federal
government’s ‘High-Intensity Drug Trafficking Area’ program, established ‘in
areas where major drug production, manufacturing, importation, or distribution
flourish.’”130  Finally, the court noted the substantial volume of drug cases that
comprised its own criminal docket.131  Thus, the court found that the Board had
established the existence of an area drug problem, which posed “an imminent
threat to the students and faculty in the Knott County school district.”132
Subsequently, the court focused its analysis on Crager’s claims that the case
was different from Knox County because Knott County teachers were “more
likely to be observed by other teachers, students, and administrators” and were
less isolated than the Knox County teachers.133  The court was not persuaded
by Crager’s argument.134  It stated that “simply because a teacher works with
multiple groups of students does not make it more likely that students will be
able to detect (or will [feel] safe reporting) drug use by teachers.”135
After finding the facts in the case to be analogous to those in Knox County,
the Crager court concentrated on Crager’s argument that Knott County could
accomplish its goals by maintaining the previously established, less intrusive
suspicion-based testing.136  Here, the court determined that suspicion-based
testing was insufficient because of “the autonomy of teachers, [who] often
work[ed] in isolated classrooms.”137  According to the court, it put “too heavy
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1998).
148. See Crager Memorandum Opinion, supra note 22, at 22.
a burden on students and teachers to not only [detect] teachers who are
operating under the effect of drugs, but also to report those teachers.”138  The
court explained that this burden for children meant “turning in their authority
figure and mentor” and that this burden for teachers meant turning in a
coworker, “with possibly disastrous personal consequences if the teacher
end[ed] up testing negative.”139  Consequently, relying heavily on the Knox
County precedent, the court determined that “the benefits of suspicionless
testing to the state [in conjunction with] the significant drug problem facing
Knott County, and the decreased expectation of privacy for teachers,
support[ed] the Board’s” right to use suspicionless testing.140
To address Crager’s allegations that the testing procedures were
unconstitutional because they violated the teachers’ privacy rights, the court
explained that “courts have traditionally required those policies to set forth
adequate safeguards to ensure reliability, privacy during testing, and
confidentiality of results.”141  Throughout this portion of the analysis, the court
stated that the Knott Policy contained significant similarities with the Knox
County policy,142 and with Chapter 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations,
which promulgates a drug testing policy for Department of Transportation
employees.143  The court focused on the fact that Knott County “outsourced
their testing to OSDS,” and testing was overseen by a Medical Review Officer
with strict procedures.144  From its review of these procedures, the court found
that the Knott Policy, as it comported with testing policies that were upheld in
Knox County and the federal regulatory policy, was constitutional.145
Finally, in examining the constitutionality of the random component of the
Knott Policy, the court noted that “the Sixth Circuit upheld the use of random
suspicionless testing” in Winters.146  The Crager court could not rely on the
Knox County precedent because the suspicionless policy in that case was a
one-time, targeted test.147  However, the court supported the propriety of
random drug tests by explaining that the Supreme Court has upheld the
constitutionality of this type of testing of students.148  While the court
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acknowledged that “the Supreme Court has only upheld random testing in the
context of student testing,” it noted that nothing in the language of other cases
involving drug testing of employees provided “an explicit prohibition against
random drug testing of adults” and that “the Supreme Court has never struck
down a testing regime simply because it provided for random tests.”149  Given
this foundational dicta, the court determined that “[r]andom testing would
significantly enhance the ability of the Board to ensure that its teachers,
involved in an extremely important and ‘safety-sensitive’ position, are drug-
free.”150  Also, the court found the random component of the drug testing
policy provided a “significant deterrent effect and a practical method for
catching drug users.”151  Consequently, the court stated that “[w]hile random
testing may slightly increase the intrusiveness of a drug test, such a minimal
increase in intrusiveness is overcome by the significantly greater effectiveness
of random testing.”152
Ultimately, the court found that the random and suspicionless components
of the Knott Policy were constitutional and the testing procedures did not
violate teachers’ privacy rights.153  The court, on December 29, 2004, denied
Crager’s motion for summary judgment, granted the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment, and entered judgment in favor of the defendants, thereby
dismissing Crager’s lawsuit.154
C. American Federation of Teachers-West Virginia v. Kanawha County
Board of Education
Approximately four years later, on November 26, 2008, Kanawha County
was filed in the circuit court of Kanawha County, West Virginia.155  The
petitioners, teachers in the Kanawha County school system and members of
the American Federation of Teachers (AFT), filed a petition for writ of
mandamus, declaratory judgment, and injunctive relief against the Kanawha
County Board of Education, Kanawha County Schools, and Superintendent
Ronald Duerring.156  The lawsuit was filed on the basis that the Board’s revised
drug testing policy, which was to implement a random, suspicionless drug
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164. See id.; see also Notice of Removal at 1-2, Kanawha Cnty., 592 F. Supp. 2d 883 (No.
2:08-cv-1406) (on file with the authors).
testing scheme on January 1, 2009, violated their Fourth Amendment rights
against unreasonable searches and seizures.157
1. Background of the Case
The lawsuit originated from the Board’s adoption of a revised drug testing
policy called the Employee Drug Use Prevention Policy (“Revised Policy”) on
October 15, 2008.158  The Revised Policy was aimed at addressing “the
problem of drug abuse in the workplace by” mandating random, suspicionless
testing for all “safety sensitive positions,” which included teachers.159  The
Revised Policy defined “safety sensitive” positions as those “which involve the
care and supervision of students or where a single mistake by such employee
can create an immediate threat of serious harm to students, to him or herself
or to fellow employees.”160  Forty-seven positions were deemed “safety
sensitive” under the Revised Policy.161  A policy statement was released
concerning the random, suspicionless drug testing program, stating that “the
job functions associated with these [safety sensitive] positions directly and
immediately relate to public health and safety, the protection of life and
property security.  These positions are identified for random testing because
they require the highest degree of trust and confidence.”162
In addition to their petition, the petitioners filed a motion for a preliminary
injunction, and a hearing for the motion was scheduled.163  Prior to this
hearing, however, the respondents removed the case to the United States
District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia on the basis of federal
question jurisdiction.164  Thereafter, the petitioners filed a motion for
preliminary injunction, and a motion hearing was scheduled for December 29,
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2008.165  On December 17, 2008, the West Virginia Education Association
(WVEA) and Dale Lee, its president, moved to intervene and filed a motion
for preliminary injunction.166  WVEA’s motion to intervene was granted, and
its other motion was held in abeyance until the December 29, 2008, motions
hearing.167  The respondents filed their responses to the pending motions on
December 22, 2008, and they filed their answer to the verified petition on
December 24, 2008.168
At the December motions hearing, the petitioners’ evidence included the
testimony of Petitioner Frederick Albert, a middle school teacher, who opined
that it would be doubtful that “a teacher’s impairment due to drugs would go
unnoticed” because “his school ha[d] cameras in the hallways, policemen who
[were] regularly in the building, sometimes accompanied by drug dogs,”169 and
a soon-to-be-in-place keyless entry system that would “track the comings and
goings of teachers.”170  On cross-examination Albert stated that the safety
responsibilities of teachers included halting fights between students, assisting
with fire drills, and working to provide a safe environment for students and
employees.171  Despite this testimony, Albert also testified that the Revised
Policy was “unnecessary . . . . intrusive . . . . demeaning . . . . [and]
demoralizing.”172
Respondent Ronald Duerring, a thirty-four-year employee of the school
system and its current superintendent, also testified during this hearing.173  He
explained that the Board had adopted a suspicion-based testing program for
teachers in 2008, had considered whether to implement the suspicionless
policy for approximately two years, and had made the Revised Policy
“available for public comment before its passage.”174  According to Duerring,
the Board devised the Revised Policy in response “to six to nine employees
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183. See id. at 2, 5-9.
who tested positive under the suspicion-based testing program”175 and a 2006
case of a Kanawha County principal who was charged with cocaine
possession.176  Although this principal was later acquitted and reinstated, these
events caused the Board to believe that drug use was becoming more
widespread among school employees.177  Duerring also testified that the Board
decided to implement the Revised Policy because of its concern for student
safety.178  Further, Duerring stressed that teachers were in safety sensitive
positions due to their dealings with children; that teachers had the legal
obligation in West Virginia to act in loco parentis to students; and that
teachers played vital “roles in ensuring the safety of children during fire drills
and bomb threats”—roles which could be impacted by a teacher’s
impairment.179  However, when the court inquired as to whether Duerring had
knowledge of any student “in Kanawha County Schools or anywhere in the
country [who had] ever suffered an injury due to a drug or alcohol impaired
teacher,” the superintendent answered in the negative.180
2. The Parties’ Arguments
To support their motion for preliminary injunction, the petitioners argued
that the random, suspicionless drug testing policy violated the Fourth
Amendment because the teachers were not “safety sensitive” employees and
the Board had not established a “special need” to justify this random,
suspicionless search.181  Conversely, the respondents, citing Knox County and
Crager,182 argued that this policy was constitutional since teachers were in
“safety sensitive” positions and the Board’s “special need” for maintaining
safety in the schools outweighed the teachers’ privacy rights.183
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189. See id. at 891-92.
190. See id. at 892.
191. Id.
192. Id. (quoting Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 308, 313-14 (1997)).
193. Id. at 892-93 (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989)).
194. Id. at 893.
195. See id. at 893-96 (discussing Skinner, 489 U.S. 602). 
3. Court’s Analysis of the Constitutionality of the Drug Testing Policy
The court began its analysis by setting forth the standard for granting a
motion for preliminary injunction.184  First, the court would determine whether
the petitioners had made a clear showing that they would suffer irreparable
harm if the court denied the motion.185  Second, the court would “balance the
likelihood of irreparable harm to [the petitioners] if the court [denied]
preliminary relief” against the likelihood of harm to the respondents if the
court granted the motion.186  Third, the court would “determine whether [the
petitioners] [had] made a sufficient showing of a probability of success on the
merits.”187  Finally, the court would “consider whether the public interest
favor[ed] granting [the motion].”188
In addressing whether the petitioners made a clear showing of irreparable
harm, the court noted that the alleged harm was “inseparably linked” to the
petitioners’ constitutional claim.189  As such, the Revised Policy had to comply
with the Fourth Amendment,190 given that drug testing is “a particularly
invasive [search] because [it], especially by urinalysis, intimately involves an
individual’s privacy and bodily integrity.”191  Further, the court explained that
governmental searches typically must be based on an “‘individualized
suspicion of wrongdoing’ to satisfy the Fourth Amendment.”192  The court
stated, however, “individualized suspicion” is not required when a search is
“conducted for ‘special needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement.’”193  The court made it clear that in determining whether a
“special need” exists to justify a suspicionless drug testing policy, a court must
inquire as to “whether there is a [requisite] safety concern that is substantial
enough to override the individual’s privacy interest and to suppress the Fourth
Amendment’s requirement of individualized suspicion.”194  After analyzing
relevant Supreme Court cases,195 the court determined that a “special need”
would exist to support a suspicionless search when there was a 
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major safety concern[] such as the great harm to people and
property that could result from a railroad accident, the threat to
national security posed by the failed interdiction of illegal drugs
smuggled across our borders, and the risk to safety created by the
potential use of deadly force by a drug-addled Customs employee
equipped with a firearm.196
Although the Kanawha County court did acknowledge that the Supreme
Court had determined “that a lesser safety concern can qualify as a special
need, it noted that this was only when the persons to be tested possess[ed] a
greatly diminished privacy interest.”197  Consequently, the court found that
“the special needs exception to a suspicion-based search was . . . a very narrow
one,” which was only applicable “when the government is faced with a safety
concern of sufficiently great magnitude to outweigh the privacy interests of the
group to be searched.”198  Moreover, the court made clear that the danger
underlying this identified safety interest must be “concrete,” meaning “an
actual, threatened danger and not some perceived potential danger.”199
Given this background, the court proceeded to balance the employees’
privacy interests against the Board’s “special needs” asserted for the adoption
and implementation of the drug testing policy.200  In considering the
employees’ privacy concerns, the court addressed the question of whether the
Revised Policy’s testing procedures were overly intrusive and violative of the
employees’ privacy rights.201  Regarding the intrusiveness of this random,
suspicionless drug testing, the court explained that it must consider “the
manner in which production of the urine sample is monitored” and the
potential for revelation of the employees’ personal information.202
Pursuant to the Revised Policy, the urinalysis testing was to be conducted
by Health Research Systems/EMSI, which would collect and test the samples
provided by the employees at their work sites.203  These collections would not
be observed without a reasonable basis to believe that “the donor [had or
would] attempt to substitute or adulterate a sample.”204  Then, the test results
“[would] be transmitted to a certified Medical Review Officer, who [would]
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provide the final results determination.”205  When an employee was selected
for testing, the Medical Review Officer (“MRO”) was required to notify
Human Resources of all negative tests within 48 hours and of all positive tests
as soon as confirmation results became available.206  However, with a positive
test result, the MRO was required to first contact the employee “to ascertain
whether there [was] an acceptable medical reason for the positive result.”207
Unlike the policy at issue in Crager, the Revised Policy did not specify what
type of action would be taken against an employee who tested positive or who
refused to take the test.208 
After reviewing the required procedures, the court determined that the
Board’s drug testing policy was not overly intrusive.209  The determination was
based on the findings that “[t]he vast majority of the collections will not be
monitored;”210 the MRO was required to keep the medical information
obtained confidential;211 and the testing was limited to the presence of certain
drugs.212
After determining that the testing procedures were not overly intrusive, the
court focused on whether the employees subject to the Revised Policy had a
reduced privacy interest, thereby supporting a random, suspicionless search.213
Here, the court acknowledged that “[p]ublic employees may have a reduced
expectation of privacy by virtue of their employment if the employment carries
with it safety concerns for which the employees are heavily regulated.”214  In
determining whether the teachers were part of a profession that is heavily
regulated for safety, the court scrutinized the respondents’ evidence presented
in support of this argument of heavy regulation.215  This evidence included the
Board’s policy that described the duties of teachers in their in loco parentis
role and the county schools’ employee identification badge and key card
policy that was established “to provide a safe environment for employees,
students and visitors on the premises in all buildings owned by Kanawha
County Schools.”216
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After reviewing this evidence, the court “[found] that the record [did] not
demonstrate that any of the school teachers or other employees [were] heavily
regulated for safety.”217  Further, the court “question[ed] whether the
respondents could offer evidence to show that teachers . . . are heavily
regulated for safety.”218  As a result, the court concluded that the petitioners
did not “have a reduced privacy interest by virtue of their employment in the
public school system.”219
After considering the petitioners’ privacy concerns, the court addressed the
issue of whether the Board had a “special need” to justify the random,
suspicionless testing under the Revised Policy.220  Here, the court reiterated its
finding that the petitioners did not occupy “safety sensitive” positions.221
Importantly, the court noted its disagreement with the findings of Knox
County,222 a case heavily relied upon by the respondents.223  Specifically, the
court claimed that the Knox County court was incorrect when it “found that
teachers occupied safety sensitive positions simply because they were
entrusted with the care of young children.”224  Although the Kanawha County
teachers did perform some duties that relate to safety arising from their in loco
parentis role, the court indicated that there was no evidence that these duties
were “‘fraught with such risk of injury to others that even a momentary lapse
of attention [could] have disastrous consequences.’”225  Further, the court
explained that the respondents failed to provide any evidence that “the
unspecified danger that teachers . . . pose to students is one that is inherent in
. . . their day-to-day job performance.”226  Moreover, the court noted the lack
of evidence regarding a widespread drug problem among employees subject
to the Revised Policy.227  Finally, the court made it clear that although the
respondents were not required to wait for an actual injury to occur, they did
have to show that “the threat to student safety is one that is a concrete, actual
danger that permeates [the employees’] ordinary job performance.”228  Without
such a showing, the court found that the safety interest enunciated by the
respondents to support the Revised Policy did not outweigh the petitioners’
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privacy interests.229
Accordingly, the court “found that the petitioners were likely to succeed in
their Fourth Amendment challenge to the random, suspicionless drug testing
provisions of the Revised Policy.”230  As such, the court determined that the
petitioners had “made a clear showing that they [would] suffer irreparable
harm [if the court declined] to issue an injunction,”231 whereas the respondents
would not be “harmed in any legally cognizable sense by being enjoined from
committing an alleged constitutional violation.”232  Finally, the court
determined that granting the injunction served the public interest.233
Therefore, on January 8, 2009, the court entered an order granting the
petitioners’ motion for a preliminary injunction.234  Subsequently, on August
21, 2009, the parties entered into a consent decree converting the court’s
preliminary injunction into a permanent injunction, which permanently
enjoined the respondents from enforcing the Revised Policy.235
D. Key Federal Constitutional Considerations
The case analyses of Crager and Kanawha County illustrate the judicial
split on the constitutionality of random, suspicionless drug testing of
teachers.236  Based on the expansion of the Fourth Amendment analysis for
suspicionless drug testing of students in Earls,237 the Supreme Court might
uphold a suspicionless drug testing policy for teachers, should the issue come
before it.238  This prognostication is implicit in the conclusions of Crager:
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“While the Supreme Court has only upheld random testing in the context of
student testing, nothing in the language of the cases provides an explicit
prohibition against random testing of adults.”239
Before the Crager court can be credited with an absolute forecast of the
future of constitutional interpretation in this area, however, three important
issues must be noted.  First, Crager, which heavily relied on the Sixth Circuit’s
Knox County decision,240 actually featured a much expanded scope in its
search.241  Whereas the Knox County policy mandated a one-time, non-random
search,242 the policy at issue in Crager was a completely random, suspicionless
search.243  Second, Knox County is not the only federal appellate decision
regarding this issue.  In 1998, the Fifth Circuit, in an admittedly abbreviated
opinion in United Teachers v. Orleans Parish School Board, expressly
determined that a suspicionless drug testing policy of public school teachers
violated the Fourth Amendment.244  Third, the Supreme Court denied the
petition for writ of certiorari that was filed in the Knox County case.245  Given
these considerations and the lower federal court split on the constitutionality
of suspicionless drug testing of teachers policies, it is now time for the
Supreme Court to rule on this issue so that school districts can make decisions
in this area based on an unequivocal determination of the nation’s highest
court.246  Based on a review of the model cases of Crager and Kanawha
County, when the Court does take up this issue, several key findings will
provide the foundation for its decision.
First, the Court will have to consider whether public school teachers have
a diminution in their expected privacy rights.247  Central to this inquiry will be
whether teachers are considered to occupy employment positions in a highly
regulated industry.248  In other words, the Court will determine whether
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teachers are in safety sensitive positions.249  Second, the Court will need to
decide whether or not the special needs asserted by school boards—typically,
the deterrence and prevention of drug use in public schools—are merely
symbolic250 or are concrete problems that overcome the general requirement
for individualized suspicion in government searches.251
If the Court, like that in Crager, determines that teachers are in “safety
sensitive” positions and are heavily regulated, it is very probable that it will
find that these teachers have a reduced expectation of privacy based on the
nature of their employment.252  This reduced expectation of privacy would
make it considerably easier for the Court to find the school’s “special need”
for implementing a random, suspicionless drug testing policy outweighs the
teachers’ privacy interests.253  As a result, the Court may be more willing to
hold that this type of policy is constitutional and does not violate teachers’
Fourth Amendment rights.254
If, however, the Court, following Kanawha County, determines that teachers
are not in “safety sensitive positions,” then it is very likely that the teachers
will not be held to have a reduced expectation of privacy.255  Without this
reduced expectation of privacy, it would be difficult for the Court to hold that
the school’s “special need” for implementing a random, suspicionless drug
testing policy outweighs teachers’ privacy interests.256  Thus, with these
findings, the Court may be more inclined to hold that a random, suspicionless
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drug testing policy is unconstitutional as a violation of the teachers’ Fourth
Amendment rights.257
Yet this analysis alone demonstrates how the Court could easily make a
fact-specific determination, as it did in Safford,258 which would leave school
districts in a continued state of uncertainty as to whether or not to adopt
suspicionless drug testing policies for teachers.  Such a fact-specific holding
is not what educators and school boards need.  Rather, the Supreme Court
should provide the country with determinative direction as to the federal
constitutionality of these policies.
However, a clear ruling from the Court, standing alone, will not resolve all
of these legal issues.  School districts are also going to be in need of guidance
from their presiding state appellate courts in terms of the ultimate direction
they should take in the adoption and implementation of policies that require
suspicionless drug testing of teachers.
III. State Constitutions and Policies That Require the Random,
Suspicionless Drug Testing of Teachers
A. Background
Many of the cases regarding the implementation and enforcement of
policies for the suspicionless drug testing of teachers have involved both
federal and state constitutional challenges.259  Various federal and state courts
have elected different strategies in the disposition of these cases.  Some courts
have considered the totality of the challenges and have deemed the policies
constitutional or unconstitutional under both the state and United States
constitutions.260  While some decisions have hinged solely on federal
constitutional grounds and have not broached the matter of state constitutional
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claims,261 other cases have involved only state constitutional challenges.262
Jones v. Graham County Board of Education263 is an important model case for
a state challenge alone.
B. Jones v. Graham County Board of Education
In a case of first impression264 filed in the North Carolina Superior Court of
Graham County on April 20, 2007,265 Susan Jones and the North Carolina
Association of Educators (NCAE) challenged the suspicionless, random drug
testing policy adopted by the Graham County Board of Education.266  The
plaintiffs alleged that the policy violated the North Carolina Constitution’s
prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures.267
1. Background of the Case
At the commencement of her lawsuit, Jones was a member of NCAE,268 a
sixteen-year employee of the North Carolina public schools,269 and a Spanish
teacher at a Graham County270 high school.271  Jones’ co-plaintiff, NCAE, is
an educational association organization whose mission is “[t]o be the voice of
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Pleadings at 2, Jones, 677 S.E.2d 171 (No. 07CVS81) [hereinafter Jones Answer] (on file with
authors).
educators in North Carolina that unites, organizes and empowers members to
be advocates for public education and children.”272  Fifty-three of the Board’s
employees were members of NCAE.273  The defendant Board oversaw the
operation of three public schools—which educated about 1300
students274—and employed a staff of 250 individuals—which included 110
teachers and administrators.275  The school system was described as “small”
and “close knit,” with a low turnover rate of “about three percent annually
among certified personnel, usually to replace retiring veteran teachers.”276  As
in many rural areas, this was a school system where “everybody [knew]
everybody.”277  A suspicion-based drug and alcohol testing policy for teachers
had been in place in the school district since 1994.278  In 2005, this policy was
revised to require suspicionless drug testing for all individuals seeking
employment with the school district.279
On December 5, 2006, the Board, under the leadership of Chairman Mitch
Colvard,280 enacted a new policy (“the Graham Policy”) that “required all
employees to submit to drug or alcohol testing upon the policy’s
implementation and required all employees to submit to random, suspicionless
testing thereafter.”281  With the adoption of the Graham Policy, Graham
County became the first school system in North Carolina to enact a random,
suspicionless drug and alcohol testing policy for every employee.282  Board
members claimed that the new policy reflected concerns about the safety of
students and employees and demonstrated the Board’s role in maintaining a
safe, drug-free work and school environment.283  Further, since safety was the
overriding concern, the Board relied upon a separate 2005 policy that declared
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that all Graham County school employees held safety sensitive positions,284
“meaning that every position within the . . . system [was] one in which
children’s safety or the safety of others [was] an overriding concern.”285
The Graham Policy broadly defined “[d]rug testing [to mean] the scientific
analysis of urine, blood, breath, saliva, hair, tissue, and other specimens of the
human body for the purpose of detecting a drug or alcohol.”286  Employees
who violated the policy were “subject to . . . personnel action by the Board
which could result in termination of employment . . . or the requirement that
the employee participate satisfactorily in [an approved] drug abuse assistance
or rehabilitation program.”287  The Board contracted with Keystone
Laboratories to collect specimens, conduct the testing, and employ a procedure
to randomly select employees.288  Pursuant to Keystone’s procedure, urinalysis
was the mode of collection for drug testing, which was not observed unless
“extraordinary circumstances existed.”289  “In the event of a positive test, an
employee [could] submit the written test result to an independent medical
review officer and [could] obtain and independently test the . . . specimen that
yielded the positive result.”290  Further, a person who tested positive would be
allowed the opportunity to meet with the Board to offer an alternate
explanation as to the cause of the positive result.291
The parties consented that the matter should be heard on August 7, 2007,
before the Buncombe County, North Carolina Superior Court, on the
plaintiffs’ motion for declaratory judgment, the defendant’s motion for
judgment on the pleadings, and the cross-motions for summary judgment.292
After consideration, the court granted the defendant’s motion for summary
judgment and denied the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on January
18, 2008.293  In an amended February 6, 2008, order, the court reaffirmed its
January 18 holding, denied the defendant’s motion for judgment on the
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303. Jones Appellee Brief, supra note 278, at 37.
304. See id. at 22-25.
305. See Jones, 677 S.E.2d at 177.  Because the court found that this constitutional provision
was violated, it did not reach the question of the other alleged state constitutional violation.  See
pleadings, and denied the plaintiffs’ motion for declaratory judgment.294  The
plaintiffs filed a timely appeal to the North Carolina Court of Appeals on
March 6, 2008.295
2. The Parties’ Arguments
On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the lower court erred in granting the
defendant’s motion for summary judgment and in denying the plaintiffs’
motion for summary judgment.296  The plaintiffs claimed that the Graham
Policy violated Article 1, Section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution, which
“prohibits the seizure of any person ‘but by the law of the land.’”297  The
plaintiffs also asserted that the policy violated Article 1, Section 20 of the
North Carolina Constitution,298 which provides that “[g]eneral warrants,
whereby any officer or other person may be commanded to search suspected
places without evidence of the act committed, or to seize any person or persons
not named, whose offense is not particularly described and supported by
evidence, are dangerous to liberty and shall not be granted.”299  Specifically,
the plaintiffs argued that the Board failed to meet its burden to prove a special
need for the random drug testing policy.300
In response, the defendant argued that school employees held safety
sensitive positions,301 that the deterrence of drug use in public schools is a
special need,302 and that the Graham Policy had safeguards that resulted in
“minimal intrusion on the employee’s privacy.”303  To support the claim that
teachers held safety sensitive positions, the defendant cited both Knox County
and Crager.304
3. Court’s Analysis of the Constitutionality of the Drug Testing Policy
In its decision, the court focused its analysis on the guarantee of Article I,
§ 20 of the North Carolina Constitution against unreasonable searches.305  The
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308. See id. at 178-79 (citing Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 855 n.4 (2006)).
309. See id. at 179 (citing Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 314 (1997)).
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court first noted that the state constitution provides at least as much protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures as the Fourth Amendment does.306
It then applied a balancing test to compare “the nature of the intrusion on the
individual’s privacy against the promotion of legitimate governmental
interests.”307  In doing so, the court made note of the general requirement for
individualized suspicion to support a constitutional search308 and the “context-
specific inquiry” that is needed when a special needs justification is alleged for
a suspicionless search.309 
Consequently, the court “beg[an] [its] inquiry by . . . examin[ing] the
intrusiveness of the . . . testing procedure.”310  It noted that, while it appeared
that only urine would be tested, the Graham Policy “[did] not specify the
‘bodily specimen’ employees [would] be required to produce.”311  Because the
policy allowed testing of a broad range of bodily specimens and provided for
the suspension of any employee with any “detectable amount of an illegal drug
or of alcohol,” the court found “that the policy [was] remarkably intrusive.”312
The court next considered whether teachers “have a reduced expectation of
privacy by virtue of their employment in a public school system.”313  Here, the
court found “no evidence . . . that [these] employees [were highly] regulated
for safety.”314  Stressing the Supreme Court’s finding that “‘[the schools’
power] permit[s] a degree of supervision and control [over schoolchildren]
that could not be exercised over free adults,’”315 the court determined that the
teachers did not have a reduced privacy interest due to their employment.316
Subsequently, the court decided that it could not find “evidence in the record
of any drug problem among [Graham County’s school personnel]”—the
special need that the new policy was allegedly designed to prevent.317  As such,
it concluded that the policy was merely symbolic and not a special need.318
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opinion) (finding that New Jersey constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and
seizures are “nearly identical” to the Fourth Amendment, and, thereafter, finding that because
a requirement for random suspicionless drug testing of students engaged in extracurricular
activities was constitutional under the Fourth Amendment, it was also constitutional under the
state constitution).
324. Jones, 677 S.E.2d at 177-78 (quoting Corum v. Univ. of N.C., 413 S.E.2d 276, 290
(N.C. 1992)). 
325. Id. at 178 (citing Virmani v. Presbyterian Health Servs. Corp., 515 S.E.2d 675 (N.C.
1999)).
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327. Virmani, 515 S.E.2d at 692 (quoting State v. Jackson, 503 S.E.2d 101, 103 (N.C.
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The court “conclud[ed] that the employees’ acknowledged privacy interests
outweigh[ed] the Board’s interest in conducting random, suspicionless
testing.”319  Based on this conclusion, the court found that the Graham Policy
“violates [the North Carolina Constitution’s] guarantee against unreasonable
searches,”320 reversing the decision of the lower court.321  After the decision,
the Board opted not to appeal to the North Carolina Supreme Court.322 
C. Key State Constitutional Considerations
In several cases involving the question of the constitutionality of
suspicionless drug testing within the schoolhouse gate, judges have expressly
acknowledged that the state constitutional guarantees against unreasonable
searches may provide more protection to their citizens than federal
guarantees.323  The Jones decision is replete with this dicta, providing that
“‘[o]ur Constitution is more detailed and specific than the federal
Constitution’”;324 the court “may not construe provisions of the North Carolina
Constitution as according lesser rights than are guaranteed by the federal
Constitution”;325 and, if the policy violated the Fourth Amendment, then it
commensurately violated the state constitution.326  North Carolina is not alone
in its perspective that “the United States Constitution provides a constitutional
floor of fundamental rights guaranteed all citizens of the United States, while
the state constitutions frequently give citizens of individual states basic rights
in addition to those guaranteed by the United States Constitution.”327  Courts
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330. See State v. Goetz, 2008 MT 296, ¶ 23, 345 Mont. 421, 191 P.3d 489, 496-97
(reiterating that Montana’s constitution provides heightened privacy rights in the search and
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United States Constitution). 
331. See, e.g., Jones Complaint, supra note 25, at 2 (alleging solely that the suspicionless
drug testing of teachers policy at issue in the case violates the North Carolina Constitution).
332. See, e.g., J.J. Stambaugh, ACLU Protests Random Drug Tests of Student Athletes in
Roane County, KNOXNEWS.COM, (Sept. 10, 2008), http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2008/sep/
10/aclu-protests-random-drug-tests-student-athletes-r/ (on file with authors) (quoting the
executive director of the ACLU of Tennessee as stating “[r]andom drug testing is not only
patently illegal under state law, but demonstrably ineffective and frequently
counterproductive”).
333. See Kanawha Cnty. Consent Decree, supra note 23, at 2.
334. Id.
in Washington,328 Hawaii,329 and Montana330 have deemed their state
constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures to be
more expansive than Fourth Amendment protections.
Given the constitutional language and the developing case law, it appears
that state constitutional challenges to policies allowing random, suspicionless
drug testing of teachers may be a more effective foundation upon which
teachers might bring a lawsuit.  This may explain why some litigants331 and
potential litigants332 in this general area are solely positing their claims of the
lack of constitutionality of educational random suspicionless drug testing
policies on state constitutional grounds.  This developing case law also
demonstrates how certain federal court litigants might have a second bite at the
apple if the Supreme Court or the controlling federal circuit court determines
that these policies are constitutional under the Fourth Amendment.  For
example, the Kanawha County Consent Decree, in which the parties agreed to
the conversion of the court’s preliminary injunction into a permanent
injunction,333 expressly provides that “if the United States Supreme Court or
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit were to rule that such
drug-testing provisions are constitutional, Defendants may move this Court to
dissolve or amend this Decree, consistent with such ruling.”334  Although this
caveat may seem like a boon to the defendants in this case, it is important to
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1987).
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of Appeals decision, the Graham County Board of Education would not file an appeal to the
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keep in mind that the court never made a determination as to whether or not
the West Virginia Constitution was violated by the policy, which would
preclude a collateral estoppel argument to a subsequent state litigation.335 
As such, even if the United States Supreme Court were to make a
determination on the federal constitutionality of random, suspicionless drug
testing of teachers (which is a vitally important decision), the litigation in this
area might just transform to a question of whether or not state constitutional
rights have been infringed.  Consequently, it will be equally important for state
appellate courts to provide guidance on whether or not these policies meet the
search and seizure requirements of state constitutions. 
With the precedent of Jones336 and Patchogue,337 teachers may stand a better
opportunity to prevail in this potential second round of litigation, after a
federal determination or on appeal to the state’s higher courts.  This likelihood
is enhanced by at least one state court case that invalidated the type of student
drug testing policy338 that had been deemed expressly constitutional under the
U.S. Constitution in Vernonia339 and Earls.340  School boards and districts
might wisely choose to avoid this type of constitutional inquiry in the context
of teachers.  Finally, given the exponential costs of extended litigations and
appeals, school boards and districts may opt out of this type of protracted
litigation based on financial and public policy constraints.341  However, the
ultimate remedy to stave off the potential of extensive litigation and sacrifices
on all sides would be rulings from state appellate courts providing the
guidance that school districts need in determining whether or not the
implementation of such policies would pass constitutional muster.
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342. Maureen McLeer Morin, Comment, Balancing Public Safety and the Right to Privacy:
The New Jersey Supreme Court Affirms Random Drug Testing for Employees Holding Safety-
Sensitive Positions, 10 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 455, 487 (2000).
343. See, e.g., Jones Complaint, supra note 25, at 1 (identifying the plaintiffs as a Graham
County teacher and a professional education association).  The Graham County Board of
Education adopted its suspicionless drug testing policy outside of any type of collective
bargaining process.  See Davis Affidavit, supra note 273, at 2.  Collective bargaining between
North Carolina governmental bodies and public employee labor unions is prohibited under
North Carolina law.  See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 95-98 (2009). 
344. See, e.g., Mark Niesse, Despite Agreement, Hawaii Teachers Resist Drug Testing,
WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2008, at A11 (noting that since the Hawaii teachers’ union agreed in
2007 to a collective bargaining agreement that required a “first-in-the-nation statewide random
drug testing in exchange for pay raises,” teachers and the union “have accepted the 11 percent
boost in pay while fighting the random tests as an illegal violation of their privacy rights”).
345. See, e.g., Kelly Holleran, New Board Member Says Drug-Testing Teachers Could Wind
Up as a Court Battle, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, July 21, 2008 (on file with authors) (quoting
a Kanawha County School Board member as stating that “she would rather use taxpayers’
dollars somewhere else than on a lawsuit.  ‘These kinds of cases are extremely expensive,’ she
said.  ‘We're talking a lot of money.  Let's take this time and be learners and not be leaders in
this.’”).
346. See, e.g., ACLU, Drug Testing, http://www.aclu.org/drug-law-reform/drug-testing (last
visited Mar. 11, 2011).
IV. Conclusion
It is imperative that the United States Supreme Court and state appellate
courts take up cases on the constitutionality of policies that allow or require
suspicionless drug testing of teachers as schools throughout the country are in
significant need of such determinations.  The majority of cases involving these
types of policies are reflective of how powerful and how divisive these issues
can be in collective bargaining situations and the resulting contracts.  In many
states, educational unions and associations “play[] a substantial role in the
implementation of random drug testing” as they stand “in a position to demand
benefits in exchange for such testing”342 or in a position to fight such policies
if they are implemented by a state outside343 (or even inside)344 the collective
bargaining process.  Court decisions on the constitutionality of these policies
will provide needed direction for these contractual negotiation processes,
especially as these cases illustrate that educational unions and associations will
continue to take a strong stance against suspicionless drug testing as a
condition of contractual employment until courts make their determinations.
Finally, judicial determinations of these cases will be useful in dealing with
the vested interests that public officials,345 partisan advocacy groups,346
taxpayers, teachers, unions, and private business entities all have in the nature
and future existence of these policies as a contractual requirement for public
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol63/iss3/1
2011] SUSPICIONLESS DRUG TESTING OF TEACHERS 459
347. Davin White, Kanawha School Board OKs Random Drug Tests, CHARLESTON
GAZETTE, Oct. 16, 2008, at P1A.
348. See, e.g., D.D. Bixby, Funding Hurts Oregon Schools, Budget Shortcomings,
Administrator Has to Oversee 2 Districts, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 27, 2009, at B8 (discussing the
harmful impact of the recession and resulting budget cuts on the public schools of Oregon).
349. See Charles J. Russo & David L. Gregory, Legal and Ethical Issues Surrounding Drug
Testing in Schools, 1999 L. REV. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 611, 638-39 (“Considering the cost of [teacher
drug] testing, let alone litigation . . . one wonders if there are not other projects where the Board
might better spend its limited resources.”).
350. The company that screens potential employees for Kanawha County conducts “about
20,000 drug tests a year for area school systems . . . [and] other government agencies.”  Ry
Rivard, Drug Policy for Teachers Likely to Be a Battle Tonight, TIMES W. VIRGINIAN
(Fairmont, WV), Nov. 20, 2008, at A1.
school teachers.  The litigation and debate surrounding suspicionless drug
testing of teachers reveal the number of stakeholders existing within the
consideration, implementation, and contesting of these policies.  In addition
to the significant considerations of protecting school children against the
harms of drugs and protecting the individual liberties of teachers, the other
tangible costs are important considerations for school districts considering
these types of policies.  For example, a Kanawha County school board
member, prior to litigation, quoted an approximate cost of $44 for each drug
test; here, “[i]f half the county’s 3,200 employees were tested [in a year] . . .
it would cost more than $70,000.”347  Given how tight school districts’ budgets
are, especially in light of the recent recession,348 this is not an insignificant
monetary cost.349  Further, these costs must be acknowledged in considering
the vested interest that private businesses, like research laboratories and other
drug testing firms, have in the continuation of these types of policies.350  As
such, judicial guidance on the constitutionality of these policies is crucial not
only to teachers but also to stakeholders outside of public education.
However, until the Supreme Court and the state appellate courts make these
complicated decisions, school districts and their counsel will be left to examine
the findings in Crager, Kanawha County, and Jones to make the best choice
for their students and for their teachers.
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